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Attribute-Based Encryption With Efficient
Verifiable Outsourced Decryption
Baodong Qin, Robert H. Deng, Shengli Liu, and Siqi Ma
Abstract— Attribute-based encryption (ABE) with outsourced
decryption not only enables fine-grained sharing of encrypted
data, but also overcomes the efficiency drawback (in terms of
ciphertext size and decryption cost) of the standard ABE schemes.
In particular, an ABE scheme with outsourced decryption allows
a third party (e.g., a cloud server) to transform an ABE ciphertext
into a (short) El Gamal-type ciphertext using a public transfor-
mation key provided by a user so that the latter can be decrypted
much more efficiently than the former by the user. However, a
shortcoming of the original outsourced ABE scheme is that the
correctness of the cloud server’s transformation cannot be veri-
fied by the user. That is, an end user could be cheated into accept-
ing a wrong or maliciously transformed output. In this paper,
we first formalize a security model of ABE with verifiable out-
sourced decryption by introducing a verification key in the output
of the encryption algorithm. Then, we present an approach to
convert any ABE scheme with outsourced decryption into an
ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced decryption. The new
approach is simple, general, and almost optimal. Compared with
the original outsourced ABE, our verifiable outsourced ABE nei-
ther increases the user’s and the cloud server’s computation costs
except some nondominant operations (e.g., hash computations),
nor expands the ciphertext size except adding a hash value (which
is <20 byte for 80-bit security level). We show a concrete con-
struction based on Green et al.’s ciphertext-policy ABE scheme
with outsourced decryption, and provide a detailed performance
evaluation to demonstrate the advantages of our approach.
Index Terms— Attributed-based encryption, data sharing,
decryption outsourcing, verifiability.
I. INTRODUCTION
TRADITIONALLY, access controls to data operate onthe assumption that data servers can be trusted to keep
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data confidential and enforce access control policies correctly.
However, this assumption is no longer true today since services
are increasingly storing data across many servers that are
shared with other data owners. An example of this is cloud
data storage where cloud service providers are not in the same
trusted domains as end users, and hardware platforms are not
under the direct control of data owners. To mitigate users’
privacy concerns about their data, a common solution is to
store data in encrypted form so that it will remain private,
even if data servers or storage devices are not trusted or
compromised. The encrypted data, however, must be amenable
to sharing and access control.
Data encryption using symmetric or public key
cryptography is not amenable to scalable access control.
A promising approach to address this issue is attribute-based
encryption (ABE), first proposed by Sahai and Waters [1].
ABE schemes can be divided into two categories: Ciphertext-
Policy ABE (CP-ABE) and Key-Policy ABE (KP-ABE) [2],
depending on the access policy is embedded into the
ciphertext or the user’s private key. In CP-ABE, an access
policy A is embedded in a ciphertext CT and a user’s private
key SK is associated with a set S of attributes. The ciphertext
CT can be decrypted by SK if and only if f (A, S) = 1 for
some predicate function f , meaning that S ∈ A. In KP-ABE,
every ciphertext is associated with a set of attributes, and
every user’s private key is associated with an access policy
on attributes. A user is able to decrypt a ciphertext only if
the set of attributes associated with the ciphertext satisfies
the access policy associated with the user’s private key.
Both CP-ABE and KP-ABE can prevent any unauthorized
users from accessing data, even if the user stores data in an
untrusted server. Such properties of ABE schemes are very
attractive in the area of cloud data storage.
However, a drawback of the standard ABE schemes is their
relatively large ciphertext size and high decryption cost, and
this problem is especially acute for resource limited devices
such as mobile devices. Specifically, in an ABE scheme, the
size of the ciphertext and the cost of decryption grow with
the complexity of the access structures/policies. Moreover,
current constructions of ABE schemes, see [2]–[5], rely on
pairing-based groups and require many pairing operations
(which are usually more expensive than exponentiations) in
decryption. Though there exist ABE schemes with constant
ciphertext size and/or constant number of pairing operations in
decryption, their access structures are restricted to AND gates
or threshold gates [6], [7], which severely limit their practical
applications. To overcome this problem, Green et al. [8] sug-
gested to outsource decryption in attribute-based encryption.
In their approach, shown in Fig. 1, a user’s private key is
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Fig. 1. System model for ABE with outsourced decryption.
split into a “transformation key” (denoted by TK), and an
El Gamal-type secret key (denoted by DK). The transformation
key can be publicly shared with a proxy, called Ciphertext
Transformation Server (CTS), while the secret key DK must be
kept private by the user. ABE ciphertexts are stored in a Cloud
Storage Server (CSS). A ciphertext CT stored in the CSS is
first submitted to the CTS which uses the key TK to transform
CT into a simple and short El Gamal-type ciphertext CT′ of the
same message, instead of being decrypted by the user directly.
From CT′, the user is able to recover the message using the
secret key DK with just one exponentiation operation. The
user’s transformation key can transform any ABE ciphertext
satisfied by user’s attributes, without revealing any information
of the underlying message to a malicious CTS. Thus, the user
saves both bandwidth and local computation time significantly.
In the following, we will use the term ABE with outsourced
decryption and the term outsourced ABE interchangeably.
In some application scenarios, it is necessary to check the
correctness of the transformation. As explained in [9], to save
computation time, a lazy proxy may return a ciphertext CT′ it
transformed previously for the same user or a malicious proxy
may return a transformation of another (or modified) ciphertext
to the user. Some of the recent verifiable computation
techniques [10]–[12] could be leveraged to construct
ABE schemes with verifiable outsourced decryption. However,
they are currently impractical for ABE systems. As explained
in [8], the solutions in [10] and [11] rely on Gentry’s fully
homomorphic encryption system [13] and one “bootstrapping”
operation of the homomorphic operation would take about
30 minutes for a high security parameter [14]. The solutions
in [12] allow a client to outsource pairing operations to a
server. However, the client still needs to compute multiple
exponentiations in the target group for every pairing it
outsources. To make their outsourced ABE system verifiable,
Green et al. [8] proposed a simple method to adapt their
RCCA (replayable chosen-ciphertext attack) systems to such
a setting. They appended a tag H (r) to the ciphertext,
where r is the ciphertext randomness and H is a hash
function modeled as a random oracle. In their RCCA secure
construction, since the final decryption allows recovery of the
encryption randomness r , the user can compute H (r) and
check whether it matches the tag. This approach essentially
requires the original tag be untampered with. Otherwise,
a malicious CTS could replace the original ciphertext and
its tag with a new ciphertext and a new corresponding
tag, and then transform the new ciphertext using the user’s
transformation key. Obviously, the user cannot detect the
dishonest behavior of the transformation server. However, the
authors did not provide a formal framework for analyzing
verifiability, and their method could only work in a heuristic
model, namely random oracle model [15]. In addition, their
method would be infeasible in the standard model, since their
constructions of outsourced ABE in the standard model did
not support recovery of the encryption randomness. Recently,
Lai et al. [9] formalized a security model for capturing the
modification in an outsourced ABE system and proposed a
concrete construction with verifiable outsourced decryption.
Their construction appends a redundant ciphertext of a
random message and a tag (computed from the real message
and the random message) to each ciphertext, and requires the
original untransformed ciphertext as an auxiliary input in the
final decryption step by the user. Compared with Green et al.’s
outsourced ABE scheme [8], the scheme in Lai et al. [9]
introduces significant overhead in both ciphertext size and
decryption operation (see the comparison in Table I). In [16],
the authors gave an efficient method to check the correctness
of the outsourced decryption in a distributed system. It requires
more than one key generation service provider (KGSP) and at
least one KGSP honestly takes the right ciphertext as input.
Otherwise, their verification model suffers from the attack as
existed in Green et al.’s security model.
A. Main Contribution
In this paper, we present an efficient method to verify the
correctness of the transformed ciphertext in an ABE system
with outsourced decryption. Specifically, our approach is
built on an outsourced ABE scheme that works in the key
encapsulated mechanism (KEM) setting where the ABE
ciphertext encrypts a symmetric session key. Instead of using
the encapsulated session key to symmetrically encrypt a
message, we first compress it to a shorter string using a
hash function, and the output of the hash function is later
used to check the correctness of the session key. However,
the hash value makes the session key loss some entropy
and makes it no longer uniform. Hence, we apply a key
extractor to the non-uniform session key to extract a nearly
uniform symmetric key, called symmetric encryption key,
which is used to encrypt the message. To verify the integrity
of the symmetric encrypted ciphertext, we compute a hash
value on the concatenation of the ciphertext and the hash
value mentioned above. The second hash value is then used
to verify the correctness of the outsourced decryption. This
method works well as long as the hash function is collision-
resistant. Intuitively, the second hash value guarantees the
integrity of the symmetric encrypted ciphertext and the first
hash value implicitly guarantees that the symmetric session
key is correct, which in turn guarantees the correctness of the
symmetric encryption key and hence the recovered message.
We provide formal proofs of the (selective) chosen-plaintext
security and the verifiability in the standard model, which
is a slight modification of the security model first proposed
in [9] for verifiable outsourced ABE. In our security model,
we explicitly specify the encryption algorithm to output a
ciphertext together with a verification key. The verification
key resists modification and serves as an auxiliary input
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of the decryption algorithm to check the correctness of the
outsourced computation. In our construction, the verification
key is just the second hash value mentioned above. We stress
that any ABE system without such an auxiliary key as input
can not check the correctness of the outsourced computation,
since any one can generate a valid ciphertext of a different
message to replace the ciphertext the user intends to decrypt.
Indeed, previous constructions implicitly view the original
ciphertext (or part of it) as the verification key.
Our approach applies to the construction of both verifiable
outsourced CP-ABE and verifiable outsourced KP-ABE.
To keep the paper compact, we present a concrete construction
of CP-ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced decryption
based on Green et al.’s CP-ABE with outsourced decryption
but without verifiability [8]. To validate the advantage of our
approach, we implement our scheme on an Intel Core PC
environment to test the performances of both the local client
and the proxy server (i.e., the cloud transformation server).
The performance results as given in Table II indicates that
our approach is almost optimal in converting a non-verifiable
outsourced ABE scheme to a verifiable one.
B. Organization
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section II,
we recall the basic definitions of cryptographic primitives
used in this paper. The definition and security model for
ABE scheme is given in Section III. The outsourced
ABE scheme with efficient verification is proposed
in Section IV. We demonstrate the efficiency of our
scheme in Section V. Finally, we conclude this paper
in Section VI.
II. BACKGROUND
A. Access Structures
Definition 1 (Access Structure [17]): Let {P1, P2, . . . , Pn}
be a set of parties. A collection A ⊆ 2{P1,P2,...,Pn} is monotone
if ∀B, C: if B ∈ A and B ⊆ C then C ∈ A. An access
structure (respectively, monotone access structure) is a collec-
tion (resp. monotone collection) A of non-empty subsets of
{P1, P2, . . . , Pn}, i.e., A ⊆ 2{P1,P2,...,Pn} \ {∅}. The sets in A
are called the authorized sets, and the sets not in A are called
the unauthorized sets.
In our context, the role of the parties is taken by attributes.
Thus, the access structure A will contain the authorized sets
of attributes. We restrict our attention to monotone access
structures. However, it is also possible to (inefficiently) realize
general access structures using our techniques by having the
NOT of an attribute as a separate attribute. Thus, the number of
attributes in the system will be doubled. From now on, unless
stated otherwise, by an access structure we mean a monotone
access structure.
B. Symmetric Encryption
A symmetric encryption (SE) scheme with key space K
consists of two probabilistic polynomial time (PPT)
algorithms: SE.Enc(K , m), mapping a key K ∈ K and a
message m ∈ {0, 1}∗ to a ciphertext C , and SE.Dec(K , c)
recovering m from C using K .
We say that a one-time symmetric encryption scheme is
semantically secure, if for any PPT adversary A
AdvssSE,A(κ) :=
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
Pr
⎡
⎢
⎢
⎣b=b′ :
(m0, m1) ← A(1κ)
b ←R {0, 1}, K ←R K
c ← SE.Enc(K , mb)
b′ ← A(c)
⎤
⎥
⎥
⎦−
1
2
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
∣
is negligible in κ .
A semantically secure one-time SE can be simply
constructed from any pseudorandom generator using the
one-time pad encryption scheme.
C. Randomness Extractor
For a discrete distribution X over , we denote its
min-entropy by H∞(X) = − log(maxω∈ Pr[X = ω]). The
average min-entropy of X conditioned on Y is defined as
H˜∞(X |Y ) = − log(Ey←Y [2−H∞(X |Y=y)]).
We recall a useful lemma that will be used in our proof.
Lemma 1 [18]: Let X , Y and Z be random variables.
If Y has at most 2r possible values, then H˜∞(X |(Y, Z)) ≥
H˜∞(X |Z) − r.
1) Randomness Extractor: An efficient function Ext : X ×
{0, 1}t¯ → Y is an average-case (k, )-strong extractor if for all
random variables (X, Z) such that X ∈ X and H˜∞(X |Z) ≥ k,
we have SD((Z , s, Ext(X, s), (Z , s, UY )) ≤ , where s ←R
{0, 1}t¯ , UY ←R Y , and SD(·, ·) denotes the statistical distance
between two distributions.
By the leftover hash lemma [18], any family of pairwise
independent hash functions H := {h : X → Y} is an
average-case (H˜∞(X |Z), )-strong extractor if H˜∞(X |Z) ≥
log |Y| + 2 log(1/).
III. NEW DEFINITION OF VERIFIABLE OUTSOURCED
DECRYPTION FOR ABE
Let A denote an access structure and S denote a set of
attributes. For generality, we will define Ienc and Ikey as the
inputs to the encryption algorithm and the key generation
algorithm, respectively. Concretely, we have
(Ienc, Ikey) :=
{
(A, S) in a CP-ABE setting
(S,A) in a KP-ABE setting
We also denote by f (Ikey, Ienc) = 1 the case S ∈ A and by
f (Ikey , Ienc) = 0 otherwise.
Definition 2 (Syntax of VO-ABE): An ABE system with
privately verifiable outsourced decryption (shorted as
VO-ABE system) consists of the following PPT algorithms:
• (MPK, MSK) ← Setup(κ, U): The setup algorithm takes
as input a security parameter κ and an attribute universe
description U . It outputs a master public key MPK (which
defines a message spaceM) and a master secret key MSK.
• (CT Ienc , VKM) ← Encrypt(MPK, M, Ienc): The encryp-
tion algorithm takes as input MPK, M ∈ M and Ienc.
It outputs a ciphertext CT Ienc and a verification key VKM.
• (TKIkey , DK Ikey ) ← KeyGen(MSK, Ikey): The trans-
formation key generation algorithm takes as input
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MSK and Ikey . It outputs a transformation key TKIkey and
a decryption key DKIkey .
• CTout ← Transform(TKIkey , CT Ienc ): The ciphertext
transformation algorithm takes as input TKIkey and CT Ienc .
It outputs a partially decrypted ciphertext CTout .
• M/ ⊥← Decrypt(DKIkey , VKM, CTout): The message
recovering algorithm takes as input VKM,
CToutIenc and DKIkey . It outputs a message M ∈ M ∪ {⊥}.
Here the special symbol ⊥ indicates that the partially
decrypted ciphertext is invalid.
Remark 1: We refer to the above outsourced ABE as
privately verifiable ABE, since the verification (in the decryp-
tion algorithm) takes care of the decryption key. We similarly
define a publicly verifiable outsourced ABE system if there is a
verification algorithm that does not take any secret information
as input. Observe that any outsourced ABE without taking
a verification key as an auxiliary input in the decryption
algorithm cannot provide a guarantee on correctness of the
transformation. The reason is that, in the public key setting,
anyone can encrypt any message into a valid ciphertext and
compute the corresponding verification key, and then use
them to replace the designated ciphertext and verification key.
An interesting problem is to minimize the size of the verifi-
cation key to save the storage and transmission bandwidth of
a client device.
A. Outsourced ABE (in the KEM Setting)
If an outsourced ABE with verification does not
have a verification key (i.e., VK = ∅), we refer
to it as the standard notion of outsourced ABE
(without verification) [8]. We denote by ABEO =
(Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Transform, Decrypt) an
outsourced ABE system. In Section IV, the outsourced
ABE essentially works in the KEM setting, where the
ABE ciphertext hides a symmetric session key. The
formal definition of attribute-based KEM with outsourced
decryption is exactly the same as that of ABE with
outsourced decryption, except that the encryption algorithm
of ABE is replaced by an encapsulation algorithm, which
doesn’t take a message as an input. We show that any
outsourced ABE system can be simply converted to
an attribute-based KEM with outsourced decryption
via the following method: the encapsulation algorithm
takes as input MPK and Ienc . It first chooses a random
session key (message) K from M, and then computes
CT Ienc ← Encrypt(MPK, K , Ienc) using the encryption
algorithm of the outsourced ABE. Finally, it
outputs (CT Ienc , K ).
B. Correctness
For a VO-ABE system, the correctness requires that for any
message M ∈M, if all parties follow the prescribed algorithms
in Definition 2, the final decryption algorithm should output
the same message M.
C. RCCA Security Experiment
We adapt the replayable chosen-ciphertext attack (RCCA)
security [8] for ABE with outsourced decryption to the one
Fig. 2. RCCA-security game for ABE with verifiable outsourced decryption.
for ABE with verifiable outsourced decryption. The difference
between them is that the adversary also obtains an additional
information, i.e., a verification key, which may be related to
the message encrypted in the challenge ciphertext.
We say that A succeeds in the game defined in Fig. 2
if b = b′. The advantage of A is defined as
AdvrccaABEout ,A(κ) :=
∣
∣
∣
∣Pr[b = b′] −
1
2
∣
∣
∣
∣ .
Definition 3 (RCCA-Security): An ABE system with
verifiable outsourced decryption is RCCA-secure, if for
all PPT adversary A, the function AdvrccaABEout ,A(κ) is
negligible in κ .
D. CPA Security
We say that an ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced
decryption is CPA-secure (or semantically secure against
chosen-plaintext attacks) if we remove the decryption queries
in both Phase 1 and Phase 2.
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Fig. 3. Verifiability game for ABE with outsourced decryption.
E. Selective CPA Security
We say that an ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced
decryption is selective CPA-secure if we add an Initiation
stage before the Setup where the adversary commits to the
challenge value I ∗enc .
If VK = ∅, the above security notions for ABE with
verifiable outsourced decryption are exactly those for the
standard ABE with outsourced decryption.
F. Verifiability
Fig. 3 presents a formal definition of the verifiability for
an ABE system with outsourced decryption, through a game
played between an adversary A and a challenger.
Suppose that the entry ( j∗, I ∗key , TKI ∗key , DKI ∗key ) has already
existed in table T . If not, the challenger can generate it
using MSK. We say that A succeeds in the game defined
in Fig. 3, if Decrypt(DKI ∗key , VK
∗
M∗ , CTout ) /∈ {M∗,⊥}.
A’s advantage is defined as
AdvvrfyABEout ,A(κ) := Pr
[A succeeds in Fig. 3].
Definition 4 (Verifiability): An ABE system with
outsourced decryption is (privately) verifiable, if for
all PPT adversary A, the advantage AdvvrfyABEout ,A(κ) is
negligible in κ .
G. Weak Verifiability
The above definition of verifiability allows the adversary
to obtain a decryption key of the challenge ciphertext. This
may be a bit too strong, as in practice, the proxy only knows
the transformation key. So, we can restrict the adversary’s
ability the same as that of the adversary in the model of
RCCA security, i.e., the adversary is forbidden to query the
Corrupt oracle on any value Ikey such that f (I ∗enc, Ikey) = 1.
We can further weaken the adversary’s ability to the selective
setting, i.e., the adversary must commit the challenge
value I ∗enc at the beginning of the game. Consequently,
it would be possible to design an outsourced ABE with short
verification key. Nevertheless, in this paper, we consider
the strongest verifiability model, which encompasses more
powerful adversary, such as a valid user in the ABE system.
IV. VERIFIABLE OUTSOURCED DECRYPTION
In this section, we first present a generic method to con-
struct ABE schemes with verifiable outsourced decryption.
Then, we provide a formal security proofs of its (selective)
CPA-security and verifiability. Finally, we present an instanti-
ation based on the outsourced CP-ABE scheme proposed by
Green et al. [8].
Our generic construction uses the following components.
• An outsourced ABE system: ABEO=(Setup′, Encrypt′,
KeyGen′, Transform′, Decrypt′), with message
space M.
• Two collision-resistant hash functions:
H0 :M→ {0, 1}H0 , H : {0, 1}∗ → {0, 1}H .
• A symmetric encryption (SE) scheme SE=(SE.Enc,
SE.Dec) with key space {0, 1}SE .
• A family of pairwise independent hash functions H from
M to {0, 1}SE .
The above parameters satisfy the following condition:
0 < SE ≤ (log |K| − H0) − 2 log(1/H)
where H is a negligible value in κ .
A. Generic Construction
We first depict the framework of our approach in Fig. 4.
In framework, the underlying outsourced ABE system works
in the KEM setting, i.e., it encrypts a random key K ∈ M
rather than a real message. Instead of using the random key to
symmetrically encrypt data, we first compute an intermediate
verification key H0(K ), and then use an extractor h to
derive a symmetric key KSE = h(K ). Finally, we use
a symmetric encryption scheme to hide the real message,
i.e., CSE = SE.Enc(KSE, M) and compute the verification
key VK = H(H0(K )||CSE). By the collision resistance of
H and H0, if VK is untampered, so are CSE and H0(K ). The
later implicitly guarantees the correctness of the recovered
random key K . By the semantic security of the underlying
ABE system, K is computationally indistinguishable from a
truly random key R ∈ M. However, this statement fails as
the verification key may reveal information on K . Recall that
VK leaks at most H0-bit information of K . So, applying an
average-case extractor h, we may derive a new random key,
i.e., the symmetric key KSE.
Next, we formally describe our verifiable outsourced ABE
system ABEV O=(Setup, Encrypt, KeyGen, Transform,
Decrypt) in Fig. 5 and its security proof.
1) Correctness: The correctness of the above ABE system
follows directly from the correctness of the underlying
outsourced ABE system ABEO and the correctness of the
underlying symmetric encryption scheme SE.
2) Efficiency: Compared with the underlying ABE system,
the new ABE only introduces one hash value (i.e., the verifi-
cation key) to the ciphertext and two hash value computations
in the final decryption operation at the user side.
B. Security Analysis
Theorem 1: Suppose that the underlying outsourced
ABE system is (selectively) CPA-secure, H is a family of pair-
wise independent hash functions, SE is a semantically secure
one-time symmetric encryption scheme, the parameters satisfy
QIN et al.: ABE WITH EFFICIENT VERIFIABLE OUTSOURCED DECRYPTION 1389
Fig. 4. The framework of generic construction of verifiable outsourced ABE.
Fig. 5. Generic construction of verifiable outsourced ABE.
0 < SE ≤ (log |M| − H0) − 2 log(1/H). Then, the
above ABE system with outsourced decryption is (selectively)
CPA-secure.
Proof: The proof applies the hybrid argument of
games [19]. We begin by defining three games: Game0,
Game1 and Game2. Game0 is the original (selective)
CPA-security game as defined in Fig. 2 for an outsourced
ABE system. We aim to prove that there is only a negligible
difference between any two consecutive games from the adver-
sary’s point of views, and in Game2 the adversary has a
negligible probability to distinguish the encryption of message
M0 from encryption of message M1. Let Si denote A’s success
probability in Gamei .
• Game0: This is the original (selective) CPA-security
game. Hereafter, let (CT∗I ∗enc , VK
∗
M)=((CT′∗I ∗enc , C∗SE), Tag
∗)
denotes the challenge ciphertext and verification key for
a challenge value I ∗enc selected by the adversary. We also
denote by K ∗ ∈ M the key encrypted in ciphertext
CT′∗I ∗enc and by K
∗
SE = h∗(K ∗) the symmetric key used
in ciphertext C∗SE.
• Game1: This game is the same as Game0, except
that we compute Tag∗0 and K ∗SE using another random
key R∗ ∈ M which is independent of K ∗ encrypted
in CT′∗I ∗enc .
• Game2: This game is the same as Game1, except
that K ∗SE is replaced by a truly random string
R∗SE ∈ {0, 1}SE .
Claim 1: Suppose that the outsourced ABE system is
(selectively) CPA-secure, then the adversary’s views in Game0
and Game1 are computationally indistinguishable.
Proof of Claim 1: We define a PPT algorithm Sim which
aims to break the (selective) CPA-security of the underlying
ABE system under the help of the adversary A. Sim simulates
A’s views in Game0 or in Game1 depending on its challenge
ciphertext. Denote by ChallO the challenger of the underlying
ABE system.
• Setup. Sim first runs ChallO to obtain a challenge public
parameter MPK′∗. Then, it chooses by itself two collision-
resistant hash functions H∗0 and H∗, a random extractor
h∗ ∈ H and a semantically secure one-time encryption
scheme SE∗. Finally, it sends (MPK′∗, H∗0, H∗, h∗, SE∗)
to A as a challenge master public key.
• Phase 1. It is straightforward to answer A’s queries,
including Create(Ikey) (for any value Ikey) and
Corrupt(i). This is because Sim can obtain the answers
of these queries via running ChallO with the same
queries.
• Challenge. Once A submits two equal-length mes-
sages M0 and M1 as well as a value I ∗enc, the simulator
Sim first chooses two independent random keys K ∗,
R∗ ∈M. It then queries ChallO with ((K ∗, R∗), I ∗enc).
ChallO will return a challenge ciphertext CT′∗I ∗enc to
the simulator. Next, Sim sets K ∗SE = h∗(R∗), and
Tag∗0 = H∗0(R∗). It also computes C∗SE = SE∗(K ∗SE , Mb)
for a random b ∈ {0, 1} and sets VK∗M = H∗(Tag∗0||C∗SE).
Finally, it sends CT∗I ∗enc = (CT′∗I ∗enc , C∗SE) and VK∗M
to the adversary. Clearly, if the “message” encrypted
in CT′∗I ∗enc is R
∗
, then CT∗I ∗enc is a challenge ciphertext
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as in Game0. Otherwise, it is a challenge ciphertext as
in Game1.
• Phase 2. The same as Phase 1, except that A can
not query Corrupt(i), in which the value Ikey satisfies
f (I ∗enc, Ikey) = 1.
Finally, Sim outputs what A outputs. From the
above analysis, Sim perfectly simulates A’s views in
Game0 or Game1. So, we have the following result:
|Pr[S0] − Pr[S1]| ≤ 2AdvcpaABEO ,B(κ)
for some adversary B attacking on the CPA-security of the
underlying outsourced ABE system. 
Claim 2: Suppose that H is a family of pairwise indepen-
dent hash functions, then the adversary’s views in Game1 and
Game2 are statistically indistinguishable.
Proof of Claim 2: Observe that in both Game1 and Game2,
R∗ is completely independent of CT′∗I ∗enc , h
∗ and the master
public key MPK. In addition, Tag∗0 = H∗0(R∗) has at most
2H0 possible values. Hence, by Lemma 1 we have
H˜∞(R∗|(MPK, CT′∗I ∗enc , h∗, Tag∗0))
≥ H˜∞(R∗|(MPK, CT′∗I ∗enc , h∗)) − H0 = log |M| − H0 .
Since 0 < SE ≤ (log |M| − H0) − 2 log 1/H, from
the adversary’s point of view (except the variable C∗SE), the
symmetric key K ∗SE extracted by h
∗(R∗) is H-statistically
indistinguishable from a truly random symmetric key
R∗SE ∈ {0, 1}SE . Observe that the C∗SE is the function of
K ∗SE, and Tag
∗ is the function of Tag∗0 and C∗SE. So, they do
not increase the distance between the above two distributions.
Therefore, |Pr[S1] − Pr[S2]| ≤ H. 
Claim 3: Suppose that the symmetric encryption scheme
SE is semantically secure, then the adversary in Game2 has
a negligible advantage.
Proof of Claim 3: Observe that in Game2, the symmetric
key R∗SE is truly random. So, we can directly construct an
algorithm B from A to attack SE∗’s semantic security. Hence,
we have
∣
∣
∣Pr[S2] − 12
∣
∣
∣ ≤ AdvssSE∗,B(κ) for a suitable adversary
B attacking on SE∗’s semantic security. 
Recall that Game0 is the original (selective) CPA-security
game for a verifiable outsourced ABE scheme. So, we have
AdvcpaABEV O ,A(κ) :=
∣
∣Pr[S0] − 12
∣
∣
.
Taking all claims together, the (selective) CPA-security of
the new outsourced ABE follows. 
In the above security proof, we only consider the (selective)
CPA-security of our scheme. Similarly, we can proof its
RCCA-security if the underlying outsourced ABE scheme
is RCCA-secure and the symmetric encryption scheme is
also RCCA-secure [20]. However, to date, all RCCA-secure
outsourced ABE schemes rely on random oracle (RO) [15].
Hence, the resulting verifiable scheme is just RCCA-secure in
the RO model. It may be an independent interest to design an
RCCA-secure ABE system with outsourced decryption in the
standard model.
Theorem 2: Suppose that H0 and H are collision-resistant
hash functions. Then, the new ABE scheme with outsourced
decryption is privately verifiable.
Proof: Given an adversary A against the verifiability, we
construct an efficient algorithm Sim to break the collision-
resistance of the underlying hash functions H0 or H. Given
two challenge hash functions (H∗0, H∗), Sim simulates the
experiment described in Fig. 3 as follows.
Sim generates the public parameter MPK and master secret
key MSK as Setup, except for hash functions H∗0 and H∗.
Note that, Sim knows the master secret key MSK. Hence,
it can simulate A’s queries in Phase 1 and Phase 2. For a
challenge message M∗ and a value I ∗enc submitted by A, the
simulator first invokes Encrypt′(MPK′, K ∗, I ∗enc) to obtain a
ciphertext CT′∗I ∗enc of a random key K
∗ ∈ M. It then sets
Tag∗0 = H∗0(K ∗) and K ∗SE = h∗(K ∗). Sim also computes
C∗SE = SKE.Enc(K ∗SE, M∗) and Tag∗ = H∗(Tag∗0||C∗SE).
After that, it sends CT∗I ∗enc = (CT′∗I ∗enc , C∗SE ) and VK∗M = Tag
∗
to the adversary. It holds VK∗M and (K ∗, C∗SE). Finally, the
adversary outputs a vale I ∗key (such that f (I ∗enc, I ∗key) = 1) and
a transformation ciphertext CTout = (CT′out , CSE). If A breaks
the verifiability, Sim will recover a message M /∈ {M∗,⊥}
via Decrypt(DKI ∗key , VK
∗
M, CTout ). We now discussA’s success
probability. Observe that the decryption algorithm outputs ⊥
if H∗(Tag0||CSE) = Tag∗, where Tag0 = H∗0(K ) and
K = Decrypt′(DKI ∗key , CT′out ). So, we only need to consider
the following two cases:
• Case 1: (Tag0, CSE) = (Tag∗0, C∗SE). Since Sim knows
(Tag∗0, C∗SE), if this case occurs, Sim immediately obtains
a collision of the hash function H∗.
• Case 2: (Tag0, CSE) = (Tag∗0, C∗SE), but K = K ∗.
Observe that H∗0(K ) = Tag0 = Tag∗0 = H∗0(K ∗). So, it
breaks the collision-resistance of H∗0.
This completes the proof of Theorem 2. 
C. Instantiation
In this subsection, we present an instantiation of our generic
construction based on the outsourced ABE system proposed
in [8], which is in turn based on Waters CP-ABE scheme [4].
We begin by introducing some basic notations used in the
instantiation.
1) Bilinear Maps: Let BP(1κ) be a probabilistic poly-
nomial time (PPT) algorithm that takes as input a security
parameter 1κ and outputs a description (p,G, g,GT , eˆ), where
G and GT are two multiplicative groups of prime order p, g
is a generator of G and eˆ : G × G → GT is a bilinear map
with the properties:
1) Bilinearity: for all g1, g2 ∈ G and all a, b ∈ Zp , we
have eˆ(ga1 , g
b
2) = eˆ(g1, g2)ab.
2) Non-degeneracy: eˆ(g, g) = 1.
3) Computability: Group operations in G and GT , and the
bilinear map eˆ are efficiently computable.
We refer to G as a bilinear group. Note that, the map eˆ is
symmetric since eˆ(ga1 , g
b
2) = eˆ(gb1, ga2 ).
2) Linear Secret Sharing Schemes: We will make use of lin-
ear secret-sharing schemes. We adopt the definition from [17].
Definition 5 (Linear Secret-Sharing Schemes (LSSS)):
A secret-sharing scheme  over a set of parties P is called
linear (over Zp) if
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Fig. 6. A verifiable outsourced CP-ABE scheme.
1) The shares of the parties form a vector over Zp .
2) There exists an  rows by n columns matrix A called the
share-generating matrix for . There exists a function
ρ which maps each row of the matrix to an associated
party. That is, for i = 1, . . . , , the value ρ(i) is the party
associated with row i . When we consider the column
vector v = (s, r2, . . . , rn), where s ∈ Zp is the secret
to be shared, and r2, . . . , rn ∈ Zp are randomly chosen,
then Av is the vector of  shares of the secret s according
to . The share (Av)i belongs to party ρ(i).
It has been shown in [17] that every linear secret sharing-
scheme according to the above definition also enjoys the linear
reconstruction property, defined as follows. Suppose that 
is an LSSS for the access structure A. Let S ∈ A be
any authorized set, and let I ⊂ {1, 2, . . . , } be defined as
I = {i : ρ(i) ∈ S}. Then, there exist constants {ωi ∈ Zp}i∈I
such that, if {λi }i∈I are valid shares of any secret s according
to , then
∑
i∈I ωiλi = s. In other words, the linear combi-
nation
∑
i∈I ωi Ai results in the “target” vector (1, 0, . . . , 0),
where Ai is the i -th row of the matrix A. It is shown in [17]
that these constants {ωi } can be found in time polynomial in
the size of the share-generating matrix A.
However, for any unauthorized sets S /∈ A, no such
constants {ωi } exist and the secret s should be information
theoretically hidden from the parties in S.
3) The Instantiation: Let GHW = (Setup′,
Encrypt′, KeyGen′, Transform′, Decrypt′) denote
the outsourced CP-ABE scheme proposed by
Green, Hohenberger and Waters [8, Sec. 3, Fig. 5].
Applying our generic construction, we immediately derive a
new CP-ABE scheme supporting both outsourced decryption
and verifiability as given in Fig. 6.
In our instantiation, the underlying ABE encrypts one
group element, which may not have sufficient (computational)
entropy for extracting a symmetric key. Nevertheless, we can
simply extend it to a random key with enough entropy via an
efficient pseudorandom number generator (e.g., AES).
4) Shrinking the Ciphertext Size: Recall that the underlying
outsourced ABE system works in the KEM setting and it
encrypts a random message R. So, we can replace the random
message R with the internal random element CT = eˆ(g, g)αs
and remove C from the ciphertext. Such modification cannot
affect its semantic security, as eˆ(g, g)αs is used to protect the
privacy of the message R.
V. PERFORMANCE COMPARISON
We compare the performance of our scheme with other
two outsourced ABE schemes [8], [9] in the setting of
key-encapsulation mechanism, which has already been
used in these two schemes to reduce the ciphertext size.
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TABLE I
EFFICIENCY SUMMARY OF OUTSOURCED CP-ABE SCHEMES
TABLE II
PERFORMANCE ON CIPHERTEXT OVERHEAD AND DECRYPTION TIME. (a) OUT. CT OVERHEAD (KBYTES).
(b) LOCAL CT OVERHEAD (KBYTES). (c) OUT. DEC OPS (SECONDS). (d) LOCAL DEC OPS (SECONDS)
Specifically, the scheme first encrypts a symmetric key, which
is then used to symmetrically encrypt data of arbitrary
length. We first give a comparison from the theoretical aspect
in Table I.
In the table,  refers to an LSSS access structure with
an  × n matrix. H refers to the output size of a
CRH function. For 80-bit security, we can choose H = 160.
P, EG, EGT denote the maximum amounts of time to compute
a pairing, an exponentiation in G and an exponentiation in GT,
respectively. “Out. CT Size” and “Local CT Size” refer to the
sizes of ciphertexts input to the transformation algorithm and
the decryption algorithm respectively; While “Out. Dec Ops”
and “Local Dec Ops’ refer to the computation costs incurred
by the transformation algorithm and the decryption algorithm,
respectively. We ignore the non-dominant operations. Indeed,
we will see shortly (see Table II) that they are negligible in
our experimental results.
To validate the advantage of our approach from the practical
aspect, we implement our CP-ABE system as well as the
other two systems in the same computational environment.
The concrete parameters are chosen as follows.
A. Parameters
We implement the ABE schemes using a 224-bit MNT
elliptic curve from the Stanford Pairing-Based Crypto (PBC)
library [21]. For κ = 80 bits security parameter, we choose
H0 = H = 160, and encapsulate a random 128-bit symmetric
key SE. In our scheme, we first hash the element CT of
group GT to a random “seed” and then apply a pseudorandom
number generator (e.g., AES scheme) to extend it to a 512-bit
key K . It sufficiently guarantees that log |K| − H ≥
SE + 2 log 2κ .
B. Implementation
To capture the worst influence on the ciphertext size
and decryption time by the complexity of access structures,
each ciphertext is generated under “AND” access policies
(A1 AND A2 AND . . . AND AN ), where each Ai is an
attribute. Then, we generate a pair of corresponding transfor-
mation key and decryption key that contain the N attributes
necessary for decryption. This approach captures the worst
case that involves all the ciphertext components in the decryp-
tion operation. Experiments are conducted on an Intel Core i5
processor with 8GB RAM running 32-bit Windows 7 operation
system. All the three implementations are just slight modifi-
cations of the libfenc ABE library [22] which includes the
Waters CP-ABE scheme. Decryption times are estimated by
picking the average over 100 iterations. We provide the results
on the performance of the three outsourced ABE schemes in
Table II. The numbers (10, 20, . . .) in the first line of the table
denotes the number of key (or policy) attributes.
C. Discussion
From Table II, we observe that for the three schemes, almost
all the ciphertext processing is outsourced to a cloud server
and that the outsourced ciphertext size and decryption time
increase linearly with the number of policy attributes, while
the local ciphertext size and decryption time are kept small
and constant. Our new scheme is verifiable and has nearly the
same efficiency as the underlying non-verifiable scheme [8].
Though our scheme and the scheme in [9] are both verifiable,
the former is much more efficiency in both ciphertext size
and decryption time than the latter. Specifically, our scheme
has half the ciphertext sizes in both server and client and
is 2 ∼ 4 times faster in decryption compared with the
scheme in [9].
VI. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we proposed a simple and generic method
to convert any ABE scheme with non-verifiable outsourced
decryption to an ABE scheme with verifiable outsourced
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decryption in the standard model. To concretely assess the
performance of the new method, we presented an instantiation
of our generic method based on Green et al.’s outsourced
CP-ABE scheme without verifiability. We implemented our
instantiation, Green et al.’s scheme [8] and Lai et al.’s
verifiable outsourced scheme [9] on PC. Experiment results
showed that our method is nearly optimal in the sense that it
introduces minimal overhead in exchange for verifiability.
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